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Federal Court Reform Should Start at the Top 
There can be little doubt that the federal courts are 
11 confronting a caseload crunch of mammoth proportions. How could 
12 it be otherwise, with more and more attorneys filing more and 
13 more lawsuits as the result of more and more causes of action 
14 created by Congress? Let's look at the numbers. In 1981, 
15 approximately 180,000 civil cases were filed in the United States 
16 District Courts. 1 In 1991, the number was nearly 208,000. 2 In 
1 7 1981 approximately 31,000 criminal cases were filed in the 
18 district courts, and in 1991 the figure was about 46,000. 3 
19 During the same decade, Congress authorized increases in district 
20 court judgeships from 516 to 649. 4 The circuit courts of 
21 appeals had 132 authorized judgeships and about 26,000 filings in 
22 1981. 5 By 1991, filings had increased by roughly 16,000 cases 
23 to 42,000, but there were only 35 more judgeships than there were 
24 in 1981. 6 
25 In the one hundred years since the Second Circuit Court of 
26 Appeals was formed, our authorized judgeships have gone from 3 to 
27 13, an increase of 433%. 7 During the same period, however, our 
28 filings have gone from 196 to 4,165, an increase of over 
29 2,000%! 8 As filings increase, without any corresponding 
D increase in the number of judges, each judge must handle more 
31 cases and the median disposition time for each case necessarily 
76 
1 becomes longer. If the mission of the lower federal courts is to 
2 provide for the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
3 every dispute brought before them, their present overburdened 
4 condition calls into question their ability to perform the 
5 mission. There are two options. The first is to continue the 
6 present course, with the expectation of incremental increases in 
7 the caseload and with expansion of the judiciary continually 
8 lagging behind need. The other option is reform, including 
9 changes in such areas as court structure, procedural rules, case 
10 management techniques, the decisional process, subject matter 
11 jurisdiction and methods of alternate dispute resolution. It 
12 seems clear that the time for reform is at hand. 9 
13 Three years ago, the Federal Courts Study Committee, created 
4 by Congress to assess the developing crisis and to make 
15 appropriate recommendations, rendered its final report. In the 
16 report, the Committee noted the existence of "mounting public and 
17 professional concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay, 
18 expense, and expansion. "10 The Committee did not recommend any 
19 increase in the number of judges, although that would seem to be 
20 a logical place to start. A lively debate is now in progress 
21 between those who believe that there should be a "cap" on the 
22 number of federal judges and those who think expansion is in 
23 order, with excellent arguments on both sides. 11 However that 
24 question may be resolved, the fact is that in recent years the 
25 President and Senate have had a great deal of difficulty in 
26 filling current vacancies. At this moment, there are 106 
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1 unfilled slots in the district courts and 20 unfilled slots in 
2 the courts of appeals. 12 
3 Back in 1975, the Hruska Commission proposed the 
4 establishment of a National Court of Appeals, a new court to be 
5 interposed between the Supreme Court and the regional courts of 
6 appeals. 13 It would receive cases on reference from the Supreme 
7 Court and by transfer from the regional courts. The Study 
8 Committee rejected the idea of a national intermediate appellate 
9 court but did present five structural change possibilities for 
10 further inquiry and discussion: A single unified National Court 
11 of Appeals operating through regional divisions; a four-tier 
12 system, with the first appellate tier consisting of 25-30 
13 regional appellate divisions hearing appeals of right from the 
4 district courts and the second-tier appellate court taking cases 
15 on a discretionary basis from the first; National Appeals Courts 
16 structured according to subject matter, as in the federal 
17 circuit; a single, centrally organized court of appeals; and 
18 consolidation of existing courts into five jumbo circuits. 14 
19 All these proposals have their unique problems, as the Study 
20 Committee indicated. 15 
21 There are those who see merit in giving the courts of 
22 appeals discretion as to what cases they will accept. 16 My 
23 chief judge, Jon Newman, has a different approach. He favors a 
24 system of discretionary access to federal courts at both the 
25 trial and appellate levels so as to reallocate jurisdiction 
26 between state and federal courts. 17 Under his proposal, 
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1 discretion as to access would be vested in the federal courts and 
2 would be exercised for individual cases and designated 
3 categories. 18 Proposals have been made to modify or severely 
4 curtail diversity jurisdiction, 19 to replace with a workers' 
5 compensation scheme the statutes allowing injured railroad 
6 workers and seamen to sue in federal courts, 20 and to establish 
7 a special court to adjudicate claims under the Social Security 
8 Act. 21 Other suggestions for reform have included a small 
9 claims procedure for certain federal tort claims, 22 the creation 
10 of an Article III Appellate Division of the United States Tax 
11 Court with exclusive jurisdiction over federal income, estate and 
12 gift tax cases, 23 a requirement for exhaustion of state 
13 administrative remedies prior to the commencement of prisoners 
4 civil rights suits24 and mandatory use of alternate dispute 
15 resolution mechanisms. 25 
16 The federal judiciary, with the assistance of the Federal 
17 Judicial Center, long has experimented with case management 
18 techniques. The authority of judges to take hold of a case in 
19 its earliest stages and to keep the case under close supervision, 
20 with established deadlines, has proved to be essential to the 
21 achievement of maximum efficiency in court operations. Despite 
22 the fact that the lower federal courts are running as fast as 
23 they can and have been refining management techniques and 
24 administrative procedures over the years, the Congress enacted 
25 the Civil Justice Reform Act in 1990. 26 The Act requires each 
26 district court in the nation to create an expense and delay 
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1 reduction plan. Just what the courts needed at a time when they 
2 are understaffed and underfunded: a congressional requirement to 
3 micromanage the courts and to reinvent the wheel. What a waste! 
4 It is Congress, of course, that is responsible for all this 
5 mess in the first place. Justice O'Connor once referred to the 
6 "underdeveloped capacity [of Congress] for self-restraint. "27 
7 Nowhere is the lack of self-restraint more evident than in the 
8 federal criminal laws. I have been writing and speaking about 
9 the federalization of crimes for more than a decade, but nobody 
10 seems to listen. There are about 3,000 separate provisions 
11 scattered throughout the United States Code criminalizing various 
12 forms of conduct. Do you know that it is a federal offense to 
13 reproduce the image of Woodsy Owl 28 and Smokey the Bear?29 To 
4 impersonate a 4-H club member?30 To transport water hyacinths 
15 in interstate commerce?31 To bring false teeth into a state 
16 without the permission of a local dentist?32 Every time 
17 Congress meets, more state crimes are made federal crimes in 
18 response to the problems of the moment. Last year it was car 
19 jacking. 33 This year it looks like it will be domestic 
20 violence, 34 a quintessential state crime. Is it any wonder that 
21 the number of Assistant United States Attorneys has increased 
22 two-and-one-half fold since 1980?35 If the number of Article 
23 III judges had increased at that rate, we would have 1,620 judges 
24 instead of the 816 we now have. 
25 Criminal statutes have not alone been responsible for the 
26 increase in business in the federal courts. Congress continues 
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1 to create new sources of civil litigation as well. Last year, 
2 Congress established a civil cause of action providing for the 
3 recovery of damages from any individual who engages in torture or 
4 killing under color of the law of any foreign nation. 36 It 
5 appears that any victim of state terrorism may sue here if there 
6 is no remedy in the place where the conduct occurred. 37 And, oh 
7 yes, there is a ten-year statute of limitations. 38 Congress has 
8 decided to turn loose on world terrorism the mightiest force it 
9 could think of -- lawyers pursuing civil litigation! That ought 
10 to strike fear into their hearts! In passing that legislation, 
11 Congress had no idea about how many suits the new statute would 
12 spawn nor what impact it would have on the federal judicial 
13 system. Such is the way with all congressional legislation. 
4 When I was a member of the Judicial Conference Committee on 
15 Federal-State Jurisdiction, I participated in the preparation of 
16 a checklist for Congress to consider in reviewing proposed 
17 legislation. 39 The checklist was designed to identify technical 
18 and interpretive problems, duplicative and unnecessary 
19 legislation and the general impact of legislation on the courts. 
20 The checklist has, I fear, come to naught. 
21 It seems to me that one of the major reasons for the 
22 inundation of the federal district and circuit courts is the 
23 uncertainty of the law. The Scriptures ask this question: "If 
24 the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to 
25 the battle?"40 My answer is: "Every lawyer worth his salt." 
26 If the law is not settled, there is every incentive to litigate. 
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1 And in our judicial system, there is only one body that can 
2 resolve uncertainty -- the United States Supreme court. Yet the 
3 High Court seldom takes the trumpet to its lips, and when it 
4 does, the sound often is very weak indeed. I respectfully 
5 suggest that, at the Supreme Court level, an increase in the 
6 number of cases decided and some changes in the decisionmaking 
7 process itself would go far toward alleviating the problems of 
8 the lower federal courts. Federal court reform should start at 
9 the top. 
10 The High Court is lumbering into the twenty-first century at 
11 the leisurely pace of the nineteenth century, seemingly oblivious 
12 to the needs of the federal judicial system. The lower courts 
13 are overwhelmed by the growth and caseload, but the Supreme Court 
4 actually is deciding fewer cases each year. One hundred and 
15 sixteen cases were decided this year, one hundred and twenty-
16 seven the year before and one hundred and twenty-five the year 
17 before that. 41 Back in the 1980s, the figure reached as high as 
18 one hundred and fifty-one. 42 The Court certainly is trimming 
19 its docket in the face of an explosive growth of cases in the 
20 lower courts. This makes no sense. We need to get the Supreme 
21 Court up to speed. The interesting part of it is that the 
22 shrinkage has come as 'the Court has gained more and more control 
23 over its dockets, culminating in the 1988 legislation that 
24 effectively eliminated the Court's mandatory appellate 
25 jurisdiction. 43 As most lawyers know, the only way to get there 
26 on appeal now is by cert. And they just are not granting enough 
7 
1 cert. petitions, in my view. For one thing, more cases should be 
2 taken in order to settle the law where circuit courts of appeals 
3 are in conflict. 
4 In the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Congress directed 
5 the Federal Judicial Center to undertake a study of the problems 
6 created by inter-circuit conflicts, including economic costs, 
7 forum shopping among circuits, unfairness to litigants and non-
8 acquiescence by federal agencies. 44 The study has not yet been 
9 completed, but preliminary reports indicate that the number of 
10 conflicts has been greater than originally thought. 45 Justice 
11 White, who recently retired, has been in the vanguard of those 
12 who believe that the Supreme Court should do more to resolve 
13 inter-circuit conflicts. He frequently dissented from the denial 
i of cert., pointing out the conflicts and urging his colleagues to 
15 resolve them. His dissents include language such as this: 
16 One of the Court's duties is to do its 
17 best to see that the federal law is not being 
18 applied differently in the various circuits 
19 around the country. The Court is surely not 
20 doing its best when it denies certiorari in 
21 this case, which presents an issue on which 
22 the Courts of Appeals are recurringly at 
23 odds. 46 
24 and this: 
25 I agree with petitioner and the 
26 Government that the outcome of a federal 
27 criminal prosecution should not depend upon 
28 the circuit in which the case is tried. 4' 





Because a uniform rule should be 
announced by this Court on this important and 
recurring issue, I would grant the 
petition. 48 
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1 Clearly, allowing circuit conflicts to continue generates 
2 litigation, because the law remains unsettled and attorneys take 
3 their cases to the forum most favorable. Where the Supreme Court 
4 has not spoken on an issue but some circuits have resolved the 
5 question in one way and some in another, litigation is encouraged 
6 in those circuits that have not yet spoken at all. Clients doing 
7 business nationally may have their conduct regulated one way in 
8 one place and one way in another and continue to challenge 
9 unfavorable precedent. Government agencies, charged with the 
10 administration of national law in a uniform way, follow policies 
11 of non-acquiescence, refusing to accept the views of a circuit 
12 that rejects the agency position. Aside from the fact that 
13 fairness is lost and justice is not seen to be done, the lower 
4 courts become clogged with cases that would not be brought if the 
15 law were clearly stated. The Supreme Court is the only place 
16 where the conflicts can be resolved, and the resolution must be 
17 accomplished more frequently and in greater numbers of cases. 
18 And I think that a greater number of important issues that have 
19 not yet festered into inter-circuit conflicts should be 
20 identified and decided by the Supreme Court in an effort to head 
21 off the inevitable clogging of the pipeline that comes from 
22 unsettled questions of law. Included in the issues that need to 
23 be resolved are thorny questions of statutory interpretation. 
24 As a frequent consumer of Supreme Court services, I often am 
25 a confused victim of the Supreme Court's uncertain trumpet. For 
26 example, in 1990 the Supreme Court decided a case entitled Grady 
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1 v. Corbin, 49 in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Brennan. The case 
2 revolved around the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
3 and changed the rule established in 1932 in a case called 
4 Blockburger v. United States. 50 According to Blockburger, 
5 whether you can be prosecuted for the same criminal act under two 
6 different criminal statutes requires a determination whether one 
7 statute requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Grady 
8 established a new gloss on the old rule. I was one of a three-
9 member panel of my court to which fell a case requiring an 
10 interpretation of Grady. Each member of the panel wrote a 
11 separate opinion, 51 so disparate were our views of what the 
12 Supreme Court had said. It is bad enough to interpret unclear 
13 statutes, but it is even worse to interpret some Supreme Court 
4 decisions. In any event, the Supreme Court modified Grady 
15 somewhat in 1992 in United States v. Felix, 52 in which it noted 
16 our difficulties in deciding our case in the Second Circuit, 
17 which it then remanded for consideration in light of Felix. We 
18 thereupon wrote a new decision in December of 1992 in which we 
19 all concurred. 53 A little over a month ago, in a case called 
20 United States v. Dixon, 54 the Supreme Court overruled the Grady 
21 decision (I think) and returned to the Blockburger rule. I say 
22 "I think," because five separate opinions were filed in the most 
23 recent case. The double jeopardy trumpet continues to emit an 
24 uncertain sound. 
25 One author has referred to "the Justices' muddy, footnote-
26 filled expository prose. "55 Far be it from me to accept such a 
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1 characterization! I do note that the members of the Court have 
2 some difficulty in agreeing on things. In Brecht v. 
3 Abrahamson, 56 a habeas corpus case decided this term, the 
4 following line-up, not especially unusual, was given: 
5 "Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
6 Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., 
7 filed a concurring opinion. White, J., filed a dissenting 
8 opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, and in which Souter, J., 
9 joined except for the footnote and Part III. Blackmun, O'Connor, 
10 and Souter, JJ., filed dissenting opinions. 1157 All those 5-4 
11 and plurality opinions serve only to engender hope among lawyers 
12 and a resolve to continue litigating. Maybe there will be a 
13 switch in votes. Maybe a new member will join the Court. Maybe 
4 some new, persuasive reasoning will be advanced by the Bar. 
15 Without certainty in the law, litigation proliferates. An 
16 attorney would not serve his or her client well if he or she did 
17 not litigate issues left open. Forgotten is this admonition of 
18 Justice Brandeis: "It is usually more important that a rule of 
19 law be settled, than that it be settled right. 1158 
20 Several other cases decided this term do not fully resolve 
21 the questions presented. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance 
2 2 Resources Corp. , 59 the vote was 6 - 3 to uphold an award of 
23 punitive damages, but the reasoning was all over the lot and no 
24 one opinion attracted a 5-vote majority. The qualifications of 
25 expert witnesses were left to the discretion of the district 
26 judges in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 60 but little 
11 
1 guidance was given as to how that discretion should be exercised. 
2 And, despite the strong language about gerrymandering used in 
3 Shaw v. Reno61 (another 5-4 decision), acceptable methods of 
4 drawing congressional district boundary lines are still very much 
5 up in the air. Thus do cases proliferate in the lower federal 
6 courts for failure of the Supreme Court to resolve inter-circuit 
7 conflicts, to identify and decide important procedural and 
8 substantive issues before they ripen into inter-circuit conflicts 
9 and to provide clear, crisp and certain opinions for the guidance 
10 of the lower courts, the bar and the American citizenry. As I 
11 see it, a greater volume of cases fully decided at the Supreme 
12 Court level as well as more brevity and clarity in the Court's 
13 opinions, would do much to relieve the congestion in the lower 
4 courts. To achieve these ends, I propose consideration of the 
15 following possibilities: 
16 1. More attention by the individual members of the Court 
17 should be paid to cert. petitions in an effort to identify the 
18 most important conflicts and issues for review. There is some 
19 basis for the belief that the present cert. pool of law clerks 
20 from the various chambers is not the most effective way of 
21 handling these matters. 62 More cert. petitions should be 
22 granted. 
23 2. The newest Justice has stressed the importance of 
24 collegiality, which sometimes includes the need to submerge one's 
25 views in unimportant matters for the good of the institution and 
26 of the consumers of its products. 63 Let us hope that Justice 
12 
1 Ginsburg is able to persuade her colleagues of the importance of 
2 one voice. Too often is heard the cacophony of what appears to 
3 be nine separate courts. 
4 3. Each Supreme Court opinion need not read as if it were 
5 the History of the World, Part I. If brevity is a virtue for 
6 judges of other courts and for lawyers, it should also be a 
7 virtue for Justices of the supreme Court. The necessary increase 
8 in production can also be achieved through per curiam opinions 
9 and summary orders. Many an inter-circuit conflict could be 
10 resolved by a brief opinion adopting the decision of one of the 
11 circuits that considered the issue. 
12 4. The effort to increase production in the Supreme Court 
13 might be assisted by cutting the summer recess from three months 
4 to two. 64 That lengthy recess really is a relic of the 
15 eighteenth century, and I know of no Justice who must return to 
16 the farm at harvest time. 
17 5. There is a statutory provision allowing certification of 
18 questions of law to the Supreme Court by the courts of 
19 appeals. 65 This provision has fallen into disuse, but should be 
20 revived, even though the Supreme Court has the right to reject 
21 the matter certified. 
22 6. The Court should be alert to the availability of its 
23 Rule 11, which allows it to grant cert. before judgment in the 
24 court of appeals. This allows the Court to take up an important 
25 case without delay, as it did in Mistretta v. United States. 66 
26 In that case, it was important to deal with the constitutionality 
13 
1 of the Sentencing Reform Act of 198467 quickly, since some 
2 district courts throughout the nation were sentencing under the 
3 new Act and some were sentencing under the old law. 
4 7. Some mandatory appellate jurisdiction might be restored 
5 in an effort to increase the Court's production. The erosion of 
6 mandatory jurisdiction over the years has been gradual, 68 and 
7 the end result seems to be fewer cases decided. Perhaps cases 
8 that involve the declaration of unconstitutionality of federal 
9 statutes would be a good place to start with mandated appeals. 
10 8. The Supreme Court certainly could address more issues if 
11 it divided itself into panels to hear cases of a more routine 
12 nature. Three panels of three judges can decide more cases more 
13 efficiently and faster than can an in bane panel of nine.~ 
4 Hearings by the full court could be reserved for cases in which a 
15 panel is in disagreement or for important constitutional issues. 
16 9. The number of Supreme Court Justices is fixed by 
17 Congress.ro Despite the explosion in federal litigation, the 
18 number of Justices has been fixed at nine since 1869! 71 Before 
19 that, the number varied between five and ten.n There is 
20 nothing sacrosanct about the number nine. In light of the 
21 potential business that the Court should be addressing, an 
22 addition of at least three seems to be warranted. The rejected 
23 proposal of Franklin D. Roosevelt to increase the number of 
24 Justices was known as a Court-packing plan and was highly 
25 political in nature. What is called for now is a Court-expanding 
26 plan to take care of additional work. 
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l 10. I suppose that there is no way to mandate the issuance 
2 of clear and thoughtful opinions in one voice by the Supreme 
3 Court. But the observations of one Justice on the subject of 
4 clarity of opinions is most illuminating. The New York Times on 
5 June 29 of this year published a photograph of Justice White and, 
6 in a caption underneath the picture, noted his retirement after 
7 31 years of service.~ The caption continued: "He said that he 
8 intended to sit on Federal appeals courts during his retirement, 
9 and that he hoped that the Supreme Court's opinions would be 
10 clear and easy to follow ... 74 I hope that Justice White comes to 
11 sit with us here in the Second Circuit as Justice Marshall did 
12 after his retirement. 75 I hope that I have the opportunity to 
13 sit with him and to join with him in applying Supreme Court 
4 precedent. We will then see if his subtle message to his former 
15 colleagues got through. We both can hope, can't we? 
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